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Commission,
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BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
BUSHCO, d.b.a. BABYDOLL ESCORTS, ET AL., APPELLANTS.
INTEREST OF AMICUS

CURIAE

The American Civil Liberties Union of Utah ("ACLU of Utah") is a nonprofit,
nonpartisan membership organization, founded in 1958. The ACLU of Utah is the state
affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), which was founded in 1920 to
protect and advance civil liberties throughout the United States. The ACLU has more
than 300,000 members nationwide. The ACLU of Utah has more than 2,200 members.
1

The ACLU of Utah has been involved extensively in litigation and advocacy to
protect the rights of speakers under the First Amendment. For instance, the ACLU of
Utah is currently plaintiff and counsel in The King's English v. Shurtleff, 2:05-cv-00485DB, a federal lawsuit challenging a variety of restrictions on Internet speech.
Additionally, the ACLU of Utah has been involved in a myriad of cases to protect and
uphold the First Amendment rights of Utah citizens, including the right to display signs,
and protest in public fora.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Amicus curiae adopt the appellants' statement of facts concerning the events
resulting in this proceeding.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Title 59, Chapter 27 of the Utah Code allows the state of Utah ("the State") to
place a severe financial burden on entities, solely on the basis of the content of the speech
in which they engage. The speech in question, nude dancing, is afforded First
Amendment protection under the United States Constitution. Content-based tax schemes
are subject to strict scrutiny. Therefore, Title 59, Chapter 27 of the Utah Code cannot be
upheld as constitutional unless the State can assert a compelling interest in selectively
taxing entities based on content, and can demonstrate that the law implementing such
action is narrowly tailored to achieve this end. The State cannot meet this heavy burden,
as it cannot demonstrate that its interest in reducing the number of and providing
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treatment for sex offenders in Utah justifies taxing businesses because they engage in a
particular expressive message.
Even if this Court determines that Title 59, Chapter 27 of the Utah Code is a
content-neutral regulation, the State cannot rely on its alleged interest in combating the
secondary effects associated with sexually explicit businesses. The Utah Legislature did
not rely on any evidence which demonstrates a reasonable believable connection between
sexually explicit businesses and the incidence of sex offense.
Finally, if Title 59, Chapter 27 of the Utah Code is a content-neutral regulation, it
cannot survive intermediate scrutiny as it is so broadly worded that it subjects lawful
expressive conduct, such as theater and dance productions, to taxation, despite the fact
that such activities clearly have no relation to the social ills the State claims it is targeting
by way of this regulation. Accordingly, under either strict or intermediate scrutiny, Title
59, Chapter 27 of the Utah Code must fail as an unconstitutional violation of the First
Amendment.
ARGUMENT

POINT 1.

TITLE 59 CHAPTER 27 OF THE UTAH CODE IS A CONTENTBASED REGULATION, WHICH SHOULD BE EVALUATED
UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW.

A. Title 59 Chapter 27 Of The Utah Code Targets Expressive Conduct Protected By
The First Amendment.
Title 59 Chapter 27 of the Utah Code, entitled "Sexually Explicit Business and
Escort Service Tax/5 (hereafter "the SEB Tax") is a content-based regulation that
impermissibly imposes a substantial financial burden on speech, not merely conduct. The

3

First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST, amend. I. The United States
Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to mean that "government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
contents." Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); see also Regan v.
Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984). Furthermore, the Court has indicated that with
respect to financial regulations, "differential taxation of First Amendment speakers is
constitutionally suspect when it threatens to suppress the expression of particular ideas or
viewpoints." Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991). Thus, tax schemes that
attempt to impose penalties on entities singled out based on the content of their speech
cannot survive constitutional scrutiny, absent a compelling state interest and
demonstration that the regulation is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest. Arkansas
Writers9Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987).
In the context of sexually oriented businesses, the First Amendment's prohibition
on selective taxation based on content does not change. In City of Los Angeles v.
Alameda Books, Inc., a case concerning regulation of sexually explicit businesses, the
Court specifically addressed the impropriety of imposing taxes based on the content of
speech. 535 U.S. 425, 445 (2002) ("A city may not regulate the secondary effects of
speech by suppressing the speech itself. A city may not, for example, impose a contentbased fee or tax. This is true even if the government purports to justify the fee by
reference to secondary effects."). The Court's conclusion in this respect was motivated
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by a concern that absent such a rule, a governmental entity might attempt to reduce
secondary effects by reducing protected speech. Id.
Here, the Court's concern is abundantly warranted. The SEB Tax applies
selectively, based solely on the protected content of communication of the First
Amendment speaker. For example, a semi-nude dancing establishment is subject to the
SEB tax on the basis of its chosen content (partially nude dance expression1) while a fully
clothed dancing establishment is immune from regulation. Examining the content of an
entity's message to ascertain tax liability is exactly the sort of evil the First Amendment
sought to protect against. See Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 229 (invalidating a
tax scheme as unconstitutional where "the basis on which [the state] differentiates
between magazines is particularly repugnant to First Amendment principles: a
magazine's tax status depends entirely on its content'").
Because the SEB Tax as enacted requires selective application based on content,
the government must demonstrate that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. In cases where the government
has asserted a compelling interest, but has been unable to demonstrate a connection
between the interest and the resulting selective action, regulations have been invalidated.
See e.g. Arkansas Writers 'Project, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (recognizing state interest in
raising revenue, but disavowing any relationship between the interest and selective
1

Nude dancing is entitled to federal constitutional protection. See City of Erie v. Pap ys
A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66
(1991). As such, the First Amendment prohibits the government from either restricting
or unduly burdening nude dancing based on the content of the speech itself. Id.
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taxation); Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Comm V of Rev., 460 U.S. 575, 586 (1983);
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467-469 (1980) (acknowledging the State's interest in
preserving privacy by prohibiting residential picketing, but refusing to permit the State to
ban only nonlabor picketing); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
120 (1991) (agreeing that State had a compelling interest in transferring the proceeds of
crime from criminals to their victims, but invalidating a statute which required that
accused or convicted criminal's income from works describing his crime be made
available to victims of crime).
The Utah State Legislature undoubtedly has a compelling interest in treating the
growing number of sex offenders within its borders. Sexually Explicit Business Tax and
Escort Service Tax: Hearing on H.B. 239 Before H. Revenue and Taxation Comm., 2004
Leg., 55th Leg. Body (Ut. 2004) (statement of Rep. Duane Bourdeaux, member, H.
Comm. on Law Enforcement and Crim. Justice). Moreover, it has an interest in raising
revenue to obtain the funds necessary to provide such treatment. The State is not
justified, however, in singling out entities to tax for this purpose, when the method of
selection is done on the basis of constitutionally protected content.
B. Title 59 Chapter 27 Of The Utah Code Impermissibly Targets Speech, And Not
Secondary Effects, As The Legislature Did Not Rely On Evidence That
Demonstrates A Reasonable Believable Connection Between The Speech In
Question And The Purported Secondary Effects Of That Speech: Sexual Offense.
Even if this Court determines that the SEB Tax is content-neutral, and was passed
for the purpose of targeting negative secondary effects, the State has not met its burden of
demonstrating that in passing House Bill 239 (the bill underlying the SEB Tax), it relied

6

upon any evidence "reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that [the bill]
addresses. City ofRenton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986).
The United States Supreme Court has held that where government restrictions on
public nudity can be classified as content-neutral, they are evaluated under the O 'Brien
intermediate scrutiny framework. See Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 289. A regulation
survives the O 'Brien test if 1) it is within the constitutional power of the Government to
enact the statute, 2) the statute will further a substantial government interest, 3) the
governmental interest is not substantially related to the suppression of free speech, and 4)
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest. O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968).
In developing the body of its First Amendment jurisprudence, however, the
Supreme Court has wrestled with setting the standard necessary to establish the second
prong in the O 'Brien framework: the regulation serves a substantial government interest.
See e.g. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 438 (holding that a "municipality can[not] get
away with shoddy data or reasoning. The municipality's evidence must fairly support the
municipality's rationale for its ordinance."); Turner Broad. Sys.f Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 664 (1994) (finding that the burden of proof is on the government to "demonstrate
that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact
alleviate these harms in a direct and material way."); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 583-86 (Souter,
J., concurring) (concluding that the city was required to show secondary effects of the
type relied upon in Renton, and not merely an interest in order and morality); Renton, 475
7

U.S. at 51-52 (stating that "The First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting
such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that
already generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is
reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.) (emphasis
added).
Thus, in the wake of Alameda Books, courts give considerable deference to the
determinations of cities and governmental entities as to their rationale in enacting
regulations that impact speech, so long as such entities can establish that they relied on at
least some concrete evidence in support of their decision. Heideman v. South Salt Lake
City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1199-1185, 1200 (10th Cir. 2003) (upholding a nudity ban as a
constitutional content-neutral regulation targeting secondary effects where ban was
enacted based on police reports and studies gathered by the city for over a year
"regarding the connection between sexually oriented commercial business and [the]
secondary effects [the city sought to combat.]"; AAK, Inc. v. City ofWoonsocket, 830
F.Supp.99, 103-04 (D.R.I. 1993) (finding city licensing ordinance violated the First
Amendment by charging higher fee for adult dancing license than for other dancing
establishments and where city did not rely on any evidence of link between secondary
effects and speech in enacting the scheme).
For example, in AAK, a city's licensing scheme was found unconstitutional where
it set a higher fee for adult cabaret entertainment licenses than for other dancing
establishments. Id. At 101-02. The court held that the ordinance violated the First
Amendment on its face because it regulated on the basis of content. Id. at 103.
8

Additionally, the city could not claim that the ordinance was enacted to target secondary
effects associated with adult cabaret establishments, as "the City conducted no
investigation of any type prior to enacting this ordinance" and there were no "special law
enforcement problems associated with [these establishments]." Id. at 104. Indeed, the
court specifically noted that the "only justification offered by the city for the ordinance
was its interest in 'societal order and morality,'"and that this was not sufficient to
withstand constitutional muster. Id.
When the Utah Legislature ("the Legislature") passed House Bill 239, it created a
law whereby controversial but constitutionally protected speech is singled out to be
burdened by a substantial tax , simply because the content of that speech is disfavored.
The Legislature asserted that the purpose of the law is to target the negative secondary
effects associated with sexually explicit businesses, namely sex offenses. However, the
Legislature made no attempt to ascertain any correlation between the number of sex
offenders and the protected speech engaged in by so called sexually explicit businesses.
Instead, at the House Committee Hearing, held on February 3,2004, the sponsor of
House Bill 239, Representative Duane Bourdeaux, merely asserted that "while most
2

See UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-27-103(1) (2004) (A tax is imposed on a sexually explicit
business equal to 10% of amounts paid to or charged by the sexually explicit
business for the following transactions: (a) an admission fee; (b) a user fee; (c) a retail
sale of tangible personal property made within the state; (d) a sale of: (i) food and food
ingredients as defined in Section 59-12-102; or (ii) prepared food as defined in Section
59-12-102; (e) a sale of a beverage; and (f) any service.) (emphasis added)
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individuals who use sexually oriented businesses do not commit sex crimes, much like
most people who smoke don't get cancer for those who do[sic], many sex offenders
utilize these types of services." Sexually Explicit Business Tax and Escort Service Tax:
Hearing on H.B. 239 Before H. Revenue and Taxation Comm., 2004 Leg., 55th Leg.
Body (Ut. 2004) (statement of Rep. Duane Bourdeaux, member, H. Comm. on Law
Enforcement and Crim. Justice). Additionally, the only study brought to the attention of
the Legislature concluded that "a cause and effect" exists between paraphilia and sex
offenders. Id, (statement of Kathy Okey, Utah Department of Corrections) Paraphilia is
defined as "a pattern of recurring sexually arousing mental imagery or behavior that
involves unusual and especially socially unacceptable sexual practices (such as sadism or
pedophilia)." Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com (last visited
Nov. 16, 2007). Markedly absent from the legislative record is any evidence connecting
sexually explicit businesses with paraphilia, or with any other negative effects.
Thus, the State has failed to establish that it relied on reasonably believable
evidence in passing the SEB Tax. As such, the assertion that the law exists solely to
combat the negative secondary effects related to sexual explicit businesses is flawed and
unsupported. Absent secondary effects as a rationale, the SEB Tax appears to be nothing
more than a regulation aimed at driving an unpopular form of expressive conduct out of
business by way of an unduly burdensome tax.
C. Even If The State's Purported Goal Of Combating Secondary Effects Is Valid,
Chapter 59, Title 27 Imposes A Substantial Restriction On Appellants' First
Amendment Freedoms, Which Is Greater Than Necessary To The Furtherance Of
Its Interests.

10

Again, assuming arguendo, that the SEB Tax is deemed a content neutral
regulation, it must also satisfy the fourth prong of the O'Brien test: the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of the government's interest. 391 U.S. at 377. The SEB Tax cannot meet
this standard.
In evaluating regulations with respect to this fourth prong, the Court has
repeatedly announced that "even content-neutral regulations must be 'narrowly tailored'
to advance the interest asserted by the State. A regulation is not 'narrowly tailored'-even
under the more lenient [standard applicable to content-neutral restrictions]-where ... a
substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance [the State?s contentneutral] goals." Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 122, n.* (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (citations omitted)
("Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect. Precision of
regulation must be the touchstone....").
Likewise, in cases dealing specifically with sexually explicit business restrictions,
courts have held that regulations that "punish[ ] a 'substantial' amount of protected free
speech, 'judged in relation to [their] plainly legitimate sweep," are unconstitutionally
overbroad. Conchatta Inc. v. Miller, 458 F.3d 258, 268 (3rd Cir. 2006); see also Odle v.
Decatur County, Tenn., 421 F.3d 386, 399 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding an ordinance
unconstitutionally overbroad because i t " 'makes no attempt to regulate only those
expressive activities associated with harmful secondary effects and includes no limiting
provisions. Instead, [it] sweeps within its ambit expressive conduct not generally
11

associated with' the kinds of harmful secondary effects it was designed to prevent.")
(citations omitted); Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 516-17 (4th Cir.
2002) (finding likelihood of success on overbreadth claim where liquor-license regulation
swept "far beyond bars and nude dancing establishments" to burden "a multitude of
mainstream musical, theatrical, and dance productions-from musical comedy to ballet to
political satire to flamenco dance"); Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 849
(7th Cir. 2000)("When the government restricts speech not associated with harmful
secondary effects, then the government cannot be fairly said to be regulating with those
secondary effects in mind and the regulation extends beyond its legitimate reach.").
The SEB Tax, like many of the regulations that have been struck down as
unconstitutionally overbroad in other jurisdictions, potentially applies to many
establishments whose activities have no relationship to the State's interest in combating
the alleged social ills attendant to sexually explicit businesses. The language of the SEB
Tax demonstrates that it applies to any business
at which any nude or partially denuded individual,
regardless of whether the nude or partially denuded individual
is an employee of the sexually explicit business or an
independent contractor, performs any service: (a) personally
on the premises of the sexually explicit business; (b) during at
least 30 consecutive or nonconsecutive days within a calendar
year; and (c) for: (i) a salary; (ii) a fee; (iii) a commission;
(iv) hire; (v) profit; or (vi) any amount similar to an amount
listed in this Subsection (4)(c).
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-27-102(4) (emphasis added).

Nothing in the language of the SEB Tax prevents its application to theater, dance
or other art groups, models hired to pose for art classes or any other legitimate form of
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expression that involves nudity. With respect to these forms of entertainment in
particular, it would no doubt prove difficult to procure evidence establishing that the SEB
Tax prevents the secondary effects of sexual offense. Accordingly, because the SEB Tax
sweeps more broadly and impacts more protected speech than necessary to accomplish
the State's goal of reducing and treating sex offenses, the SEB Tax cannot survive even
the more lenient O 'Brien intermediate level of scrutiny. As such, it must be declared
unconstitutional.

3

Art is of course, entitled to full First Amendment protection. See Nat'l Endowment for
the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 603 (1998) ("art is entitled to full protection because our
'cultural life,' just like our native politics, 'rests upon [the] ideal' of governmental
viewpoint neutrality").

13

CONCLUSION

The central tenant of the First Amendment is to protect the right of citizens and
entities to engage in unpopular speech. Thus, any action by the government to interfere
with this right and to discriminate on the basis of the content of speech undermines this
protection. Government is entitled to enact laws to protect its citizens from social ills,
but must do so in a way that is narrowly tailored to target only that conduct that is
problematic, and that preserves the ability of entities to engage in protected speech. For
these reasons, as well as those set forth in Appellants' brief, we urge the Court to find
that the SEB Tax is an unconstitutional violation of Appellant's First Amendment Rights.
Dated this 16th day of November, 2007.
American Civil Liberties Foundation of Utah, Inc.
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